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A RESPONSE TO GREGORY CLARK 
A God of Peace and Love? - -
Reflections From a Biblical Scholar 
Karla G. Bohmbach 
As a member of this journal's editorial board, one of my 
duties is to read and evaluate articles submitted for 
publication as they are sent my way by the editor, Tom 
Christenson. When I read Gregory Clark's article, I thought 
definitely that we should publish it. My main comment to 
Tom was that it would be greatly desirable to solicit 
respondents who might interrogate further the practicality of 
Clark's proposal for church-related colleges. In the back of 
my mind, as I made that comment to Tom, I thought of how 
much I was looking forward to reading such responses when 
the issue came out. Tom had other ideas. He requested a 
response from me. What has resulted is actually some 
questions, derived mainly from my work as a scholar of 
biblical studies. I hope such questions prompt further 
comment- and further questions! - from readers. 
Gregory Clark affirms the stance taken by John Milbank -
that all philosophies and institutions, whether ancient, 
modem, or postmodern, are built on an ontology of violence. 
In this way a critique is made of Alasdair Maclntyre's 
position concerning the postmodern liberal university, which, 
for MacIntyre, would be a place of constrained agreement 
(and so, presumably, non-violent). The problem for Clark, 
who is following Milbank here, is that such a university, 
insofar as it engaged with other "institutionalized versions of 
moral enquiry" would remain within an ontology of violence. 
For these engagements would be managed dialectically, and 
dialectics can never lead to harmony but, at most, only a sort 
of managed conflict which, in the end, is still violent. 
Instead of an ontology of violence, Clark desires an ontology 
. of peace. He argues that such an ontology of peace is to be 
found in the person of Jesus, the person who preeminently 
reveals "the God who is love and peace." As a biblical 
scholar, my reaction is to interrogate the ways in which 
Jesus did, and did not, reveal such a God. 
Jesus lived in a violent world. And far from shying away 
from that world and its violence, he seems to have 
deliberately opened himself up to it. Although his message 
was greeted frequently with suspicion, skepticism, and 
Karla G. Bohmbach is Assistant Professor of Religion at 
Susquehanna University, Selinsgrove, Pa. 
vilification, he did not back down or retreat from it, even 
when, as one account has it, the people of his own hometown 
attempted to kill him (Luke 4: 14 - 30). Eventually he set his 
face toward Jerusalem, even though he knew the sharp 
opposition facing him there from the religious authorities. 
And, once in Jerusalem, he engaged in an act that most see 
as the precipitating event of his final suffering: the 
overturning of the moneychangers' tables in the Temple 
itself. Although it may not have been as physically violent as 
has been depicted in such movies as Jesus Christ Superstar, 
the act at least had overtones of violence. Not only, then, 
does Jesus receive violence onto himself, here, at least, he 
actually imposes it on others. Jesus' violence begets further 
violence, now enacted against him, as he is arrested, tried, 
scourged, and crucified - a sequence of events which, by 
all accounts, was horrifically violent. 
Not only was violence a part of Jesus' life, he also warned 
his followers that such would be their fate: 
"Do not think that I have come to bring peace to the earth; 
I have not come to bring peace, but a sword. For I have 
come to set a man against his father, and a daughter against 
her mother and a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law; 
and one's foes will be members of one's own household" 
(Matt. 10: 34-36; cf. Luke 12: 51-53). 
If, indeed, the God who is found in Jesus is a God of love 
and peace, it seems that the love and peace comes about in 
and through the acceptance of violence - and the suffering 
that often accompanies such violence. The events of the 
Passions, which lie at the very center of Jesus' life and 
mission, are an overwhelming witness to Jesus' ready 
acceptance of, and patient bearing of, the violence being 
inflicted upon him. Followers of Jesus forget this at their 
own peril, for the message to them, too, is that if love and 
peace will be constitutive of their lives, such will not occur 
unaccompanied by, or exclusive of, violence. 
If we do as Gregory Clark urges us to do, and proclaim 
Jesus on our campuses, what would that look like? In 
particular, what would it mean if we took to heart the Jesus 
who made himself vulnerable to the violence of his world? 
We, too, live in a violent world. Dare we look unblinkingly 
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into the face of such violence, take it upon ourselves, and 
even, if called upon to do so, bear up and suffer in some way 
because of it? As staff, administrators, and teachers on 
college campuses related to the church, how might our tasks 
be affected, even altered, by a serious living out of the 
words. 
WHAT I HAVE LEARNED: MAYBE PLATO WAS RIGHT 
Richard Yivisaker 
A popular view of Plato holds that his world view has had 
a great and largely detrimental influence while being 
transparently false. I have not been immune to this oddly 
dismissive attitude. It is with no little surprise, in fact, that 
I have gradually come to see that Plato may have been 
right. About everything? No. About some important things, 
however, clearly yes. I want to fix on one point in 
particular, a point which reverberates in a special way for 
those who inhabit the academic world. But first a brief 
consideration of some other points where Plato had an 
insight that merits preserving. 
PRELIMINARY EXAMPLES 
(1) Communities Are Not Necessarily Better Off By
Becoming More Diverse.
We do not have to accept the vision of social differentiation 
and hierarchy idealized in the Republic to see the truth in 
Plato's view that a good society requires unity in diversity. 
Diversity may be necessary, but it is not sufficient. It 
contains the seeds of discord and disintegration along with 
the potential for enriched life, as homogeneity brings unity 
while threatening loss of vitality and decay .. Everything 
depe11ds on the wedding of diversity to some unity of 
purpose. We may accept Charles Taylor's notion that a 
"presumption" of value is owed to any deeply rooted 
culture, but this presumption has to be tested in an 
encounter of cultures whose outcome is uncertain. 1 This 
requires a commitment to such encounter on the part of the 
community, and this commitment is. the unity of purpose 
which constitutes the community. If we were to turn our 
attention to the call for increased diversity at colleges of the 
church, creating the necessary unity in diversity would be 
a major task. It is not a matter of simple addition. 
(2) If Politics Is To Be More Than A Struggle For
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Power By Competing Interests, It Has To Be Assumed 
That There Is A Moral Basis For Politics Which 
Transcends Special Interests. 
Indeed, even the rightful pursuit of power on behalf of a 
. particular interest assumes this. In our commitment to 
democratic politics we may reject some or all of the extreme 
measures to which Plato is led by this assumption. But the 
challenge of constructing a democratic process consistent 
with it is great. This may not mean, as it did for Plato, that 
the challenge is unmeetable. But the reduction of democracy 
to a naked or thinly disguised struggle for power parades 
itself daily.2 Plato knew a difficult problem when he saw 
one. 
(3) The Much-Derided Dualism of Body And Soul
Contains A Measure Of Truth.
Even ifwe take the radical dualism in Phaedo at face value, 
there is more to be said for it than fashionable criticism 
allows. We want to say, of course, that the very idea of 
disembodied existence is both unappealing and barely 
conceivable (if conceivable at all). But this does not remove 
the problems of embodied life which rightly concerned 
Plato. 
Of particular interest is his worry about the impact of 
embodiment on our cognitive life. For embodied creatures 
awareness of the world is mediated by organs which register 
and transmit sensory data. This leads to diverse points of 
view, depending on species nature, on individual physiology 
and psychology, on space-time location, and on cultural 
factors carried by language. The hope of liberating rational 
consciousness from such dependence may strike us as 
fanciful if not preposterous. As may the idea that we can 
aspire to a form of consciousness which is without any 
point of view and thus god-like. But bridging differences in 
point of view is a cognitive (and moral) imperative for us. 
So also, then, is discovering a process which in some way 
makes this possible. Plato saw all of this with great clarity. 
The point here is related to the earlier ones about morality 
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